


26 January 1976

George,

Re the attached (which I have just received), Dr. Hall's comment on Korea (footnote 276, p. 155) accurately reflects part of the picture; the other part, of course, is the intensive Community effort, underway since last year's KIQ Strategy Report, to remedy our deficiencies with respect to intelligence on and understanding of the ROK armed forces in all aspects of their performance. I'm not sure, however, that Dick Lehman's draft -- which I think is excellent -- has a place for comment at the level of detail.



NIO/JP

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WEL
MEL
CFV
USSR recommendations
SP none
SSEAFEL
LA none
SA none
ED
CH none

STAT

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Certainly the progress we have made toward meaningful arms control agreements is a case in point. The Intelligence Community has over the last ten years improved its capabilities to follow the activities of Soviet military forces to the extent that the U.S. has been able to enter into arms control negotiations confident that adherence to the resultant treaties could be monitored. The savings that have flowed from just the first of these arms control agreements has repaid the intelligence effort. The scope of the negotiations has expanded to cover new areas from which reductions in armament expenditures and more importantly, reduction in the risk of major war, are likely to result.

26 January 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: D/DCI/NIO

SUBJECT : Additional Comments on Draft
Pike Committee Report

The discussion of Portugal (pp 178 ff) overlooks some salient facts, introduces some irrelevant ones, and draws erroneous or distorted conclusions from still others. Thus, it is overlooked that the Intelligence Community had given more attention to Portugal in the two months preceeding the April 1974 coup than it had accorded that country for some years (20 plus articles in the National Intelligence Daily in March and April, plus the NIOs request to OCI in March for an assessment on Portugal. Thus, the fact that analysts had deadlines and meetings is of little or no consequence (some of these meetings and deadlines were ways of getting the required work done; perhaps, in hindsight, there should have been a few more meetings and tighter deadlines). And thus the charges that NIOs lack authority or that CIA and the attaches failed to communicate, which are advanced by the Committee report to explain the failure, are



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National Intelligence Officer
for Western Europe

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Remarks:

SUBJECT: Further Comments on Pike
Committee Draft

Attached is a 22 January note to me
from [redacted] which warrants your
attention in connection with our collec-
tive review of the House Select
Committee's draft report.

cc: Mr. Rogovin

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FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE
George A. Carver, Jr., D/DCI/NIO	1/25/76

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22 January 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: D/DCI/NIO

SUBJECT : Inaccuracies in Pike Committee Draft

1. In the flood of inaccuracies and distortions running through this document as a whole, the following is a rather minor one, but for the record I should note that the account of my testimony re Portugal (page 183) conveys a couple of false impressions:

- a. The report (page 183) has me saying that NIOs "cannot order that papers be written ... cannot instruct clandestine operations to collect certain types of information. Nor will the NIO always be informed of covert actions that may be underway in one of his countries."
- b. The fact is, that in response to a series of questions from Mr. McClory and Mr. Aspin, I sought to delineate the functions and powers of the NIOs, said they do not have command authority over the Directorates, and proceeded to make plain (pages 793-795 of Part II of printed Hearings) that "Since I work for the Director, I can make a request that has the effect of an order

25X1 [] My authority derives from the fact that I am the Director's National Intelligence Officer for Western Europe. The word "National" in that title indicates responsibilities above and beyond just the Agency or any one department. The offices, the producing offices, within the CIA are extremely responsive. A request from me has the immediate and full effect of an order.

Mr. Aspin. How about on the covert side? Would they jump, too?

25X1 [] I should make clear, sir, my business is involved in the estimating and analysis side.

Mr. Aspin. I mean covert intelligence. I am asking, can you levy requirements on the covert side?

25X1 [] The clandestine collection of information?

Mr. Aspin. Yes

25X1 [] I can ask the Deputy Director for Operations for assistance on that and I have uniformly gotten prompt help from them when it was requested.

Mr. Aspin. It is different from being in a position to actually give the orders, isn't that true?

25X1 [] Well, you don't write their efficiency reports and if somebody didn't want to cooperate you might have a lot of difficulty. My experience has not been ---"

Needless to say, the above is, if not 180 at least about 175 degrees different from the thrust of the Committee's report.

2. The "25 plus countries" business was elicited by questions from Congressmen McClory and Aspin and, though I'm not entirely without sympathy for the proposition that my work load has been full, it was certainly not cited as a reason for failing to predict a coup in Portugal on 25 April. In the state of the evidence, I would not have predicted a coup in Portugal on 25 April if I had been charged with worrying about Portugal and nothing else.

3. The Cyprus section (page 190 ff of draft report) is such a mish-mash as to be almost hopeless. Its least inaccurate parts are those lifted from the IC Staff's Post-Mortem, and as I wrote to the DCI and the authors, when that document was published, it was seriously flawed by important omissions and tendentious argument.

- a. Even worse are the Committee's suggestions that the CIA knows who shot Ambassador Davies (page 205) -- a nasty charge which would probably constitute criminal libel were it not protected by Congressional immunity; and the almost indiscriminate acceptance of Henry Tasca's retrospective self-serving memories about whether (and why not) the US failed to warn Ioannidis before the attempt on Makarios.

25X1



25X1



25X1

National Intelligence Officer
for Western Europe

National Intelligence Officers

24 January 1976

*ME input
to Lehman
piece*

NOTE FOR: Review Staff

SUBJECT : Further Comments on Pike
Committee Report

Attached is a note from Sam Hoskinson
which I think you will find quite useful in
the development of our comments and position
on the Pike Committee report.

[Signature]
George A. Carver, Jr.
D/DCI/NIO

Attachment

cc:

Mr. Cary

O/D/DCI/NIO:GACarver/mec
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23 January 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. George Carver
FROM : Samuel M. Hoskinson *Sam*
SUBJECT : Comments on Pike Committee Report

1. I have reviewed the draft Pike Committee Report and have the following comments to make on those sections that concern my present responsibilities or past experience. These comments could be incorporated into the Agency's general response or, in some instances, the minority dissenting view.

2. There is a statement in this report that "Diplomacy is preferable to war; yet it is nearly impossible, today, to evaluate how well intelligence serves diplomatic ends." In the Middle East this is clearly not the case. In fact Secretary Kissinger has called our support to his Middle East negotiating effort "a model of how knowledge and analytical capability can be brought to bear on problems of high policy" (Kissinger to Colby letter of 11 September 1975). Some of this story is too sensitive to be spoken of in public, but some of it can and should be told since it demonstrates well both the relevance of intelligence to high diplomacy and the efficacy of the NIO system.

3. Our role began shortly after the end of the October 1973 War when as the new National Intelligence Officer for the Middle East I started working very closely with a small group of high State Department and NSC Staff officials who were helping Secretary Kissinger develop his step-by-step approach to the Arab-Israeli conflict. By tuning into their thinking at the conceptual stage and, even in many cases before it had gone to Kissinger, I was able with their help to identify a number of specific areas where intelligence could make a direct contribution. With this background, I was able to advise appropriate elements of the Intelligence Community on how best to focus and fine tune their efforts in support of a critical area for American diplomacy. This process proved especially valuable in the area of geographic intelligence. Some examples of this work include:

-- Special new maps of the Golan Heights, Sinai and West Bank of the Jordan River were drafted by the cartographers. These were specially designed for use in negotiations and based on the latest and best sources of information, including satellite photography. They were used extensively during the course of the original disengagement negotiations between Egypt and Israel, and Syria and

Israel as well as for the recent successful interim settlement negotiations between Israel and Egypt. There have been several new editions of these maps which have been declassified and are available to the public as well as in use by the UN.

-- The latest satellite photography was also made available to the negotiators and was used during the discussion of critical issues relating to terrain. For example, the large hill that stands opposite the town of Quneitra on the Golan Heights was the subject of much contention during the Golan disengagement negotiations and the photography was helpful in clarifying points and positions. Similarly, satellite photography of the strategic Sinai Passes was invaluable in helping to resolve the issue of the extent of Israeli military withdrawals.

-- At several points during the recent US mediated Israel-Egypt negotiations leading up to the Sinai II agreement geographic research based on satellite photography and other sources enabled Secretary Kissinger and his associates to -- in his words -- "maintain our independent view of the situation and of what was required to break the several stalemates in the negotiations." Because of geographic research, the US negotiators were, for instance, able in several instances to suggest alternative solutions to complicated withdrawal issues that would not have been otherwise available. They knew what was possible to do on the ground and what would only result in later problems.

-- Finally, it is worth noting that just prior to the start of Secretary Kissinger's round of Middle East shuttle diplomacy in August 1975 he asked the National Intelligence Officer for the Middle East to go to Sinai and make an independent and objective judgment on the critical geographic issues concerning the Mitla and Giddi Passes. The NIO was accompanied by the senior CIA geographer concerned with the Middle East. Their conclusions were reflected in the final decisions by the parties on this difficult problem.

4. We also have the example of our aerial reconnaissance program in the Middle East. Since the conclusion of the Middle East disengagement agreements we have at the request of Israel, Egypt, and Syria conducted on a regular basis high altitude reconnaissance of the Suez and Golan disengagement areas to monitor the degree of compliance with the terms of these agreements and have reported the results to the parties. The value of this program is demonstrated by the fact that Egypt and Israel have publicly agreed to its continuation in the Sinai II agreement since it provides them both with a greater sense of confidence and an incentive to be careful about their military activities. In this case intelligence is being used in a new and creative way to help prevent the outbreak of war in an area vital to US interests.

5. Obviously there are many distortions in the section devoted to the 1973 Middle East War (page 162 ff). My greatest concern, however, is that the Committee has made no effort to look into what the Intelligence Community has done to improve since 1973. A few examples should suffice to make the point:

-- A number of steps have been taken to improve informal substantive communications among analysts within the Intelligence Community. For instance, whenever the situation appears to be heating up an interagency group of analysts known as the Middle East Forum meet under the auspices of the National Intelligence Officer for the Middle East to exchange facts, perceptions and judgments. A conscious effort is made to develop and examine in detail all possible theories by taking a sort of devil's advocate approach.

-- We have also turned to more systematic techniques for examining the heavy daily flow of intelligence relating to the war-peace problem. For instance, for some time senior analysts from all the intelligence agencies have been participating in a program of Bayesian quantitative analysis whereby their judgments on key pieces of evidence are weighed and mathematically aggregated and projected on a weekly basis. While certainly not foolproof, this approach does provide a systematic approach by people with different perspectives to the difficult problem of identifying important indicators and integrating them into judgments on possible future developments.

-- We have also revamped our whole approach to estimating Middle East military developments at the national intelligence level. Not only do we attempt to identify the absolute military strengths of the major antagonists but now we try to envisage the alternative ways in which a new Middle East war might develop and be played out. This includes the factoring in of such critical variables as Soviet intervention. In doing this kind of analysis we are also turning to the use of new methodology and have set up a fixed schedule for review of all major judgments. Not surprisingly, our policy customers have found this new approach most helpful as have those in the Defense Department responsible for contingency planning of various kinds.

- Finally, we have not been shy about re-entering the estimating field after our "failure" in 1973. We have, for instance, produced two major estimates concerning "next steps" in the Middle East during the last year at critical points when it looked like the situation was deteriorating again.

6. The comments concerning detailees to the NSC are obviously distorted. The three years I spent at the NSC were of immense benefit to my development as a professional intelligence officer. It was a rare opportunity to work at the center of power and thereby develop a refined sense of policy-maker requirements for intelligence. Why is it that the preponderance of Foreign Service Officers on the NSC Staff has drawn on fire from Congress?

WASHINGTON

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
September 11, 1975

Dear Bill:

During the long negotiations between Egypt and Israel which culminated in the Agreement of this past week, a small, discreet group of your specialists has supported us with expert analyses and long hours of hard work. I would appreciate it if you could find a way to express my personal thanks to each one of them and to tell them that their work was a significant contribution to our ability to conduct these negotiations successfully.

In my view, the close relationship between my colleagues and yours in this effort has been an outstanding model of how the knowledge and analytical capability which this Government has at its command can be brought to bear on problems of high policy. In this case, this relationship enabled us at several important stages in these negotiations to maintain our own independent view of the situation and of what was required to break the several stalemates in the negotiations.

Warm regards,



Henry A. Kissinger

The Honorable

William E. Colby,

Director,

Central Intelligence Agency.

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26 January 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: D/DCI/NIO

SUBJECT: Comment on HSC Report

REFERENCE: Your Memos, Same Subject, dated
24 and 26 January 1976

1. Selected pages from main Committee Report.

We have no comments on these pages. None of them pertain to our area and it is in any event quite difficult to comment on snippets taken out of context.

2. Draft Minority Report, Section I.

I think it is a mistake in the 4th line from the bottom to use the term "trial and error", as though this were in some sense a description of the intelligence process. I suggest that the pertinent sentence be amended as follows: "Additionally, the report gives the impression that the committee feels that all intelligence effort must be perfect, as if in real life the secrets of others can invariably be penetrated."

3. Draft Minority Report, Section II.

This section describes a personal investigation undertaken by the writer. He notes (3rd line from bottom, page 2), that he personally visited intelligence facilities in the US and abroad. The users that he cites are, however, all from abroad. It is a fact that security policy is formulated in Washington and that the principal users of strategic intelligence are located in this country. It would have been more persuasive, I think, if he could have cited such users as well.

4. Draft, Section III -- Intelligence Performance and what has been done about it. The first thing that needs to be said is that the style of this section is quite different from the style of the preceding two. It will rather easily be seen as the product of another

hand, particularly if the word "our" is retained in the 2nd line, page 1.

5. It is suggested that the word "specific" be inserted in front of the word "events" in line 4, page 1.

6. It is also suggested that the word "likely" replace the word "possible" in line 8, page 1. Clearly the task of intelligence is to focus on the likely, even if specific events cannot be predicted, and not just on the possible.

7. On page 2, the 1st sentence of the 2nd paragraph would better read: "The India-Pakistan war of December 1971 is an excellent example of the proper functioning of intelligence warning."

8. I would suggest two changes in the first full paragraph on page 3. In the 3rd sentence, I would substitute "unobtainable" for "lacking", as being a more correct statement both of the facts and of the difficulties involved in most situations. The present 4th sentence ought not to state that the prediction would "regularly be wrong". Suggest that it read as follows: "The prediction would almost never be exactly right, and often quite wrong."

9. Second full paragraph, page 3, 3rd sentence. Suggest that the 1st part be rewritten as follows: "Consistently accurate prediction of such decisions is impossible: . . ."

10. Page 4, 1st full paragraph. This is not a good paragraph, merging, as it does, two separate thoughts, and subordinating in parentheses a most important point. I strongly urge that the 1st sentence -- rewritten as suggested below -- be added to the 2nd full paragraph on page 3. The rewrite would be: "The decision not yet made, the small group of colonels plotting against their government, the act on impulse or on accidental opportunity -- all make political prediction a game the intelligence officer is wise not to play." This rewrite, among other things, omits any speculation about what the taxpayer does or does not pay the intelligence officer to do. I would make the 2nd part of the paragraph, now in parentheses, a separate paragraph, standing

on its own, with the parentheses removed and the first sentence revised as follows: "There is also the prediction that leads to action which makes the prediction wrong."

11. There is a further point not made in this section which ought to be made. To wit, that the active collection of intelligence on an impending event, such as a coup d'etat, in order to make possible a prediction of such an event, can lead to the unjustified accusation that US intelligence is actually fomenting the coup d'etat. In short, political or diplomatic considerations can require that the search for predictive information be subordinated to larger policy considerations. Such a point could well be made on page 4, preceding the paragraph that begins: "By the standards of warning. . . ."



National Intelligence Officer
for Latin America

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NIO # 0129-16

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Remarks:

SUBJECT: HSC Report

Per your request, I have asked my NIO associates to review the dissenting view rough draft (Parts I and II) and the list of statements from the Draft Final Report with an eye toward providing specific examples of actions which have been taken to correct past deficiencies. Additionally, they have reviewed Mr. Lehman's Draft Part III. Forwarded herewith are several comments for your use.

cc: Mr. Lehman ✓ SC/DCI
Review Staff

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FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE
George A. Carver, Jr., D/DCI/NIO	1/27

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